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Abstract
The international monetary system is known to be asymmetric given the dominant use 
of a few international currencies. The international trade of developing countries is 
mainly invoiced in US dollars, unlike industrialized countries which invoice a much 
higher share of their exports in their home currencies. The same logic is at work in the 
issuance of international debt. While the attempts to challenge the supremacy of the US 
dollars have failed in most cases, China is coming to the fore and is increasing its use 
of the Renminbi, even supported by its growing recognition within the International 
Monetary Fund. By reassessing the relevance of existing academic works, this paper 
demonstrates how monetary asymmetries have been reinforced in recent decades, and 
offers explanations related to currency choices. Finally, this paper offers the conclusion 
that international monetary reform is necessary. One cannot overlook that the monetary 
system embodies a major constraint on the sovereignty of developing countries and that 
some developing countries have set out to challenge the US dollar usage. 
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I. Introduction
Monetary relations are asymmetric since the actors involved in globalization only 
use a handful of national currencies in their cross-border operations, particularly the US 
Dollar (USD). The impact of asymmetric monetary practices is significant: not only 
is the country issuing the international currency known to derive enormous benefits 
from the widely-discussed exorbitant privilege, but conversely most of the world and, 
developing countries in particular, is constrained by using a foreign currency. 
This paper focuses on two aspects illustrating of the asymmetry of monetary 
practices: international trade invoicing on the one hand and international debt issuance 
on the other hand. In both sectors, the US Dollar is as of now the most widely used 
currency, especially in developing countries. With regard to international trade invoicing, 
we owe the first empirical study to Grassman (1972) who revealed the main pattern 
of invoicing and provided some ground-breaking insights. International debt issuance 
has been the object of many studies, the most acclaimed of which was that conducted 
by Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002). As these works suggest, developing 
countries denominate their cross-border trade and their international debt in top foreign 
currencies (Cohen 2000) – mainly the US Dollar – while most industrialized countries 
use their own currencies. The aim of this paper is to reassess the above-mentioned 
works, as well as the implications of asymmetry in international monetary practices. As 
a matter of fact, it is worth noting that monetary practices regarding trade invoicing and 
debt issuance follow the same trend. The US Dollar has been markedly gaining strength 
since the 1970s. Moreover, it should be noted that developing countries which attempted 
to break away from the US Dollar by devising alternative monetary practices relying on 
their own national currencies have not been successful in their efforts. Still, the monetary 
system is undergoing internal changes: of particular relevance today is the surge of the 
Chinese Renminbi (RMB), predicted to reach the status of a second-rank currency. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II explores and revisits Grassman’s Law 
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in the light of the latest developments in trade invoicing practices. Section III of the 
paper deals with the issuance of international debt and Original Sin. The supremacy of 
the US Dollar is increasingly questioned by developing countries through recent attempts 
to denominate their international debts in their own currencies. Finally, Section IV 
concludes. 
II. The Issue of International Trade Invoicing 
As international trade involves money transfers, the currency of choice has been the 
object of several studies in international economics. In his seminal contribution (1973), 
Grassman identifies a number of trends determining invoicing choices in international 
exchanges.
A. Grassman’s law
Grassman’s law is usually mentioned in works addressing the choice of currency in 
international trade, and is still extensively referred to today. In 1968, Sven Grassman 
aims to show that in an exchange involving two industrialized or so-called developed 
countries, the currency of the exchange for goods and services will most likely be that of 
the exporter about two thirds of the transactions. This is a symmetric relation. Swedish 
imports are invoiced in the currency of the exporter in the same order of magnitude, 
and a much smaller portion is denominated in Swedish kronor. The author goes on to 
extrapolate on the data as the study on Swedish firms is considered robust and it is partly 
because data on the invoicing currency in international trade are extremely scarce. For 
example, data gathered in the same period on Germany and Denmark fully support the 
Grassman’s thesis. 
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Table 1. Denomination of Swedish trade in 1968
                                                                                                                   (% of total)
Currency Exporting country’s currency
Importing country’s
currency The third currency
 Swedish exports 66 25 9
 Swedish imports 59 26 15
(Source) Grassman (1973). 
Grassman therefore dismisses that the US Dollar reigned supreme in international 
trade. His observations bring to light the use of the exporter’s currency in most of its 
transactions for exchanges involving developed countries. 
The author’s conclusion on the lack of international currency is no longer valid in the 
light of his own statistics regarding developing countries. For these countries, the USD is 
usually the norm, as noted by Tavlas (1991). Finally, the United States (US) constitutes 
an exception, along with the United Kingdom (UK) to a lesser extent, due to the status 
of both the pound sterling and the US Dollar as reserve currencies, which is why both 
imports from and exports to the United States are usually invoiced in US Dollar1. A 
global perspective on exchanges taking developing countries into consideration helps to 
somewhat qualify Grassman's conclusions. Only a fraction of the world, the so-called 
developed countries, can afford to avoid invoicing predominantly in US Dollar, while 
by contrast international trade involving developing countries is almost fully dollarized. 
The hierarchical layout of currencies available for international trade is thus reflected 
in the ways in which international trade can be envisioned as one of the expressions of 
monetary sovereignty, of which developing countries are deprived.
B. Dollar dominance in international trade invoicing 
With several decades of hindsight, it appears that monetary practices have neither 
moved towards a rebalancing in favor of the currencies of developing countries nor away 
from the US Dollar, indeed quite the reverse has occurred. Industrialized countries have 
1 At the time of writing, Grassman had only detailed trade data on Sweden, but was able to look at Swedish exports to the US, which 
were for the most part invoiced in USD, not in Sweden’s national currency, as was the case for most of its Western partners. 
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preserved the ability to invoice in their own currencies, a fact confirmed by the database 
shared by Kamps (2006). In 2012, recourse to the euro by eurozone members exporting 
outside the eurozone amounted to 60%2. The principles laid down by Grassman are 
therefore proven to be correct. However, it should not be overlooked that the US Dollar 
has been gaining ground in several developed countries like France: the share of US 
Dollar in France’s exports rose from 9% in 1974 to 18.6% in 1995 and reached 38.5% 
in 20123. In most other developed countries, the majority of exports are invoiced in US 
Dollar: in 2009, over three-quarters of Australia's exports were invoiced in US Dollar. 
New Zealand also exports mainly in US Dollar (Fabling and Sanderson 2015), and so 
does Japan (Ito and alii 2010). The international trade of Canada, a country neighboring 
the US, is mainly invoiced in US Dollar. Even Sweden, which served as the reference 
to Grassman’s work, saw its share of Swedish krona collapse (Wilander 2006, Friberg 
and Wilander 2008). The krona only accounted for 30% of Sweden's exports in 2012 
according to Eurostat. Clearly, many developed countries have come to have gradually 
lost some of their ability to invoice in their own currencies. As for developing countries, 
the data collected by Kamps (2006) suggest that the USD has retained a strong position, 
an impression corroborated by the most recent data available at the time of writing 
(Lai and Yu 2014). Likewise, Ito and Chinn (2014) emphasize that over 80% of Asian 
exports are still invoiced in US Dollar, except for Japan. The US Dollar also prevails 
in Latin America, as reflected by Brazil, which denominated over 94% of its exports in 
2011 in US Dollar (Reiss 2014). 
C. Struggles of developing countries 
In the past, Grassman (1973) noted that developing countries differed in their 
invoicing practices from developed countries for two main reasons: in many cases, their 
currencies are not convertible, and secondly their export structures are dominated by 
primary products. The former is logically perceived as a serious drawback for developing 
countries: if access to the national currency is restricted or impossible for trading partner, 
it cannot be considered viable for invoicing exchanges between two parties, who will 
agree on a vehicle currency. The financial structures in these countries are relatively 
2 According to Eurostat.
3 Dunajewski (1985) for data regarding 1974, Bekx (1998) regarding 1995, Eurostat for 2012.
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vulnerable, which requires governments to exercise control over their capital accounts 
and prevent the convertibility of the national currency for the rest of the world. Such 
restrictions are often necessary for the stability of those countries where financial 
systems are immature (McKinnon and Schnabl 2014). 
Developing countries are usually more specialized in primary products. The 
homogeneity of these products implies that competition is driven by prices only. For the 
producer, exchange rate movements are crucial. Exporters have a strong incentive to 
be in line with their competitors, and to invoice their products in a vehicle currency of 
a large outlet market. Moreover, commodity prices are particularly volatile, especially 
when compared with the prices of manufactured goods (UNCTAD 2014). Such volatility 
can be explained to a large extent by the lack of elasticity of supply as well as demand. 
Producers in developing countries are left with no choice. In order to stabilize their 
income, they need to resort to hedging instruments. They need financial services, the 
most suitable of which are available in very few currencies, with the US Dollar topping 
them all4. A hedging instrument of exchanges functions as an insurance that buyers and 
sellers need. Sales contracts for raw materials are largely organized around the futures 
and options markets, where price volatility is often observed (Calabre 1986). That is how 
actors from developing countries are pushed towards adopting the US Dollar standard 
and are assimilated into globalized trade and its corollary of financial globalization (Smith 
2009). 
A third reason may be added to the first two, based on the observation that a great 
deal of international trade originates from multinational firms. These are still largely 
Western or the US firms. These firms tend to invoice all of their exchanges in the same 
currency, regardless of the place of their production sites, which as a rule is the currency 
of their countries of origin (Benguria and Wagner 2012). The increasing fragmentation 
of global production did not result in a diversification of international monetary practices. 
Globalization sucks new players into international trade, but what they adopt is 
existing monetary conventions.
D. Monetary challenges 
All currencies are endowed with an inclusive quality in international trade, which 
4 “For some currencies no functioning forward market exists, and so when forward transactions have to be effected it is necessary to 
use some generally accepted currencies” (Grassman 1973). 
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unites the community of traders together. This notion of inclusive quality is akin to the 
coalescing effect expounded by international macroeconomists (Ito and Chinn 2014). It 
is reinforced by the observation of the difficulties faced by developing countries in their 
efforts to break free from the dollar standard. Most developing countries are still using 
the US Dollar, regardless of their diplomatic relations with the US. It is useful at this 
point to bear in mind that the Union Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) made frequent 
use of the US Dollar when trading with the West5. Currency generates membership 
regardless of existing conflicts between commercial actors.
Attempts by emerging countries to make favorable changes in the international 
monetary regime by trying to promote currencies other than the US Dollar have so far 
failed. One can find evidence of such failures in Iraq’s past, when Saddam Hussein, 
shortly before his overthrow, began to invoice Iraqi oil in euros or Iran until recently, 
where the oil bourse uses non-dollar currencies like the euros has experienced significant 
difficulties (Looney 2004, Idem 2007). 
Additionally, the wave of Latin American heads of state who espoused the doctrine of 
the Bolivarian Left and rose to power in the 2000s have expressed the wish to sever their 
well-established ties with the US Dollar (Feige et al. 2003). Their desire to be liberated 
from the US Dollar through a credible alternative route has not been realized. Venezuela 
has sought to challenge the role of the US Dollar in Latin America. The Sistema Unitario 
de Compensacion Regional de Pagos (SUCRE) plan was launched in January 2010 
and brought together the eight members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas - 
with Uruguay also joining in March 2013. It promoted a system of regional payments, 
based on a common unit of account which means that transactions between the member 
states would not have to use the US Dollar (Gnos, Monvoisin and Ponsot 2010). As 
noted by Labaqui (2014), in practice, neither the Banco del Sur nor the SUCRE has yet 
materialized it in any meaningful fashion. 
The examples discussed above all involve public actors with ties to the oil industry 
since the oil contracts signed by these countries involve their governments and are more 
widely publicized, but also because the issue of the currency used by public actors raises 
public awareness of the importance of economic sovereignty. Even for private actors 
in the same developing countries, the US Dollar standard constitutes a non-negligible 
hurdle, since it requires them to purchase dollar supplies, which makes an operation 
more costly than if it had been made in the national currency. Foreign exchange 
5 Dunajewski (1985). It is agreed that the Soviet currency was not convertible.
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fluctuations are a real constraint on pricing as well as revenue forecasts. Unloved as it 
may be, the US Dollar still remains the international monetary standard, particularly for 
developing countries6. Moreover, developing countries are not the only ones to fail in 
this respect. The developed countries expected to become the future issuers of a credible 
rival currency have never been in a position to compete with the US Dollar (Pansot 
2016, Faudot 2015). In the past, the Deutsche mark, the yen and the euro have all in turn 
been erroneously identified as potential challengers (Cohen 2014). These failures have 
revealed that bare political opposition to the US was grossly insufficient to set in motion 
a dynamics of real changes in national and regional monetary practices (Norrlof 2010)
E. The case of renminbi 
As opposed to the examples studied above, the RMB seems likely to move up in 
the hierarchy of currencies. The internationalization of the RMB is a statistical reality, 
based on a gradual process of liberalization which is politically controlled and is tested 
first on a local scale through pilot schemes. The RMB came to existence with the advent 
of the People’s Republic of China several decades ago, but its spread beyond China 
emerged, as a response to the dollar shortage caused by the financial panic at the wake 
of global financial crisis in 2008 which crippled international trade. This expansion can 
furthermore be explained by a long period of sustained growth of the Chinese economy. 
In fact, it seems that invoicing practices are shifting towards a greater use of the RMB 
by international agents. Admittedly, the RMB is not convertible, which is a genuine 
hurdle to its internationalization a genuine hurdle to its internationalization. China is 
facing strong external pressures of massive hot money inflows in the environment of 
very low interest rates to be found in industrialized countries. The maintenance of capital 
controls appears necessary for the sake of financial stability, even if it hinders RMB 
internationalization (McKinnon and Schnabl 2014). However, the Chinese currency is 
becoming increasingly accessible, as it has established a presence in a growing number 
of key areas in the world. Its use is now encouraged by the executives, particularly for 
trade, who have undertaken the design of the settlement infrastructure necessary for 
the internationalization of the RMB (Rhee and Sumulong 2013). As noted by Prasad 
6 As noted by Ronald McKinnon (2013), "although nobody loves the dollar standard, the revealed preference of both governments and 
private participants in the foreign exchange markets since 1945 has been to continue to use it. It is a remarkable survivor that is too valuable 
to loose and too difficult to replace."  
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(2014), RMB invoicing is more common for Chinese imports as there is demand for this 
currency by non-residents. That is one way of taking RMB out of China. Indeed, in the 
second quarter of 2014, out of the 3.27 trillion RMB cross-border trade settlement, 1.23 
trillion RMB were used for exports and 2.04 trillion RMB for imports (People’s Bank of 
China, PBoC 2014). An ever larger amount of Chinese exports are nevertheless invoiced 
in RMB each year, leading to a rapid growth of RMB-settled international trade.
Figure 1. Monthly RMB cross-border trade settlement 
(billions of RMB)
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(Source) People’s Bank of China.
  
Legal offshore centers supply many banks around the world with RMB, and the 
agreements brokered by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) with other central banks 
make provision for the use of credit lines to make RMB available to settle international 
trade (Ballantyne, Garner, and Wright 2013). Regardless of the different appraisals of 
economists regarding the resilience of capital controls, the RMB has now been able 
to attract demand and catch the eye of international financial actors beyond the mere 
prospect of speculative gains arising out of expectations of upcoming RMB appreciation, 
despite the non-convertibility of the Chinese currency. The Society for Worldwide 
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Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) indicates that in international trade 
deals passing through its network of interconnected banks, the RMB continues its steady 
growth. In January 2012, RMB has climbed its way from the twentieth to the fourth place 
in the ranking of international payments currencies, having outpaced the Swiss franc and 
the yen in October 20157. Started in 2009 and bolstered by the 2014 opening of RMB 
hubs in European financial centers like London, Frankfurt, and Paris, the RMB keeps 
expanding in international exchanges. The share of RMB-settled trade deals relative to 
all of Chinese trade with the rest of the world amounted to a negligable percent in 2009, 
then rose to 8.8% in 2011, and almost 25% in 2014 (Chinn and Ito 2014, PBOC). Figure 
2 charts its remarkable surge since 2009.
Figure 2. Cross-border trade settlement 
                                                                                               (billions of RMB) 
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(Note) In the first half of 2014, RMB cross-border trade settlement reached 3.27 trillion RMB.
(Source) Rhee and Sumulong (2013) and People’s Bank of China.
 
We have to qualify our conclusions by outlining that the RMB amounts to only 
7 The RMB returned fifth place at the end of 2015, following disappointing PBoC releases on RMB cross-border trade settlement. 
Despite this multiple digit growth of RMB use, we have to keep in mind that its share remains minor in the payments world: in value, 
the RMB amounts to 2.17% of payments within SWIFT compared to more than 28% for the euro and more than 44% for the dollar 
(Swift 2015).
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2% of world payments, while the US Dollar is still the dominant currency even for 
China’s cross-border trade. Furthermore, the Chinese economy has been recently hit by 
a financial crash and an economic slowdown. Given that the RMB is internationalizing 
primarily through international trade – particularly imports – the decrease of Chinese 
imports more than 5% year-on-year since November 2014 is a bad sign for the RMB. 
Nevertheless, important institutional reforms like the implementation of a new payments 
system, i.e., Cross-border Inter-bank Payments System (CIPS) that will improve and 
facilitate RMB trade settlement shall eventually strengthen the RMB (PBoC 2015). 
Additionally, the RMB has been included by the International Monetary Fund in 
November 2015 in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, joining the world’s four 
major currencies. The SDR reform is expected to better depict the current patterns of 
the international economy by assigning to the RMB 10.92% of the basket, the third 
biggest share, after the US Dollar and the euro. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) eventually addressed the request made by Zhou (2009) after the 2008 crisis for 
well-representing SDR. The long road of RMB internationalization can be therefore 
considered as a success in facilitating a more balanced relationship between China and 
the US-dominated world within international organizations such as the IMF. 
China’s singularity could potentially move within the hierarchical structure of the 
current monetary system. This evolution, however, does not alter the fundamentally 
unequal nature of this structure as a whole. The following section, centered on the 
problem of international debt issuance, seeks to elaborate on this view.
III. The Issue of International Debt Denomination 
In the framework of globalization, both public and private actors supply a significant 
portion of international debts. However, as with international trade invoicing, the 
denomination of bonds is limited to a few currencies, which is especially a matter of 
concern for developing countries.
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A. Original sin and international debt issuance
Original sin refers to the inability of many emerging and developing economies to 
borrow abroad in their own currencies. This is one of the key factors of their financial 
fragility (Ponsot 2015). Original sin has a negative impact on these economies in that 
it puts them at financial risk by creating a currency mismatch between their revenues 
collected in their national currencies and the financing of their activities in a foreign 
currency, mainly the euro and the US Dollar. In a much-celebrated article, co-authored 
by Panizza (Eichengreen et al. 2002), they relinquished what they had previously 
labelled the domestic component of original sin, that is, a situation in which the domestic 
currency cannot be used to take out long-term loans because of high-level domestic risks. 
They claimed that shortcomings in national macroeconomic policies and institutions 
were not statistically related with original sin and found that the size of a country was 
the only statistically robust determinant of original sin. Several measures of original sin 
(OSIN indexes) were devised in order to assess its intensity, determinants, and impacts 
with maximum accuracy. 
Other parameters can have an impact on original sin, such as international transaction 
costs, network externalities, global capital-market shortcomings, monetary credibility, 
the exchange-rate regime, the level of the public debt burden, and the size of the investor 
base. 
Yet, it has been argued that the literature on original sin overlooks some other 
important determinants such as the export-to-GDP ratio, holdings of international 
reserves and foreign assets, the depth and importance of local bond markets, and the 
presence of foreign banks lending in their local currencies rather than cross-border 
lending. Overall, debt composition and debt ownership ought to receive more attention 
(Dell’Erba et al. 2013).
B. The case of Brazil
A few emerging countries have endeavoured to counter the effect of original sin by 
unilaterally developing local-currency-denominated bonds at the international level. 
The most enlightening case is Brazil. In September 2005, the first large long-term debt 
issuance in the domestic currency was launched by the Brazilian government. This was 
part of a broader strategy aimed at reducing and improving the external public debt 
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profile. It was well-received by foreign investors and expectations were high that the 
leading Latin American economy was en route to being redeemed of its original sin.
The first issuance of real-denominated international bonds (Global 2016) yielded a 
12.5% yearly interest over 10 years (Tovar 2005) and the 200 international investors 
received a return of five times their original investments (1.5 billion US dollars). 
Even though this revolutionized Brazilian external debt management, at the end of 
the year the outstanding international government debt denominated in Brazilian reais 
represented only 2% of the total. In order to diversify the pool of investors the National 
Treasury issued global bonds. The issuance occurred simultaneously on and off-shore on 
Asian markets and concluded at closing on the US market, a mechanism called Green 
Shoe (Margolin 2007). For the Brazilian treasury, the purpose of this issuance was to 
familiarize international investors with the currency while protecting the local public 
market. 
In 2006, the National Treasury continued its policy of qualitative improvement of the 
external debt profile, which led them to issue another global bond with the same profile 
of maturity and yield. As with the previous year, real-denominated bonds were massively 
purchased, which allowed the treasury to renew the issuance twice. In 2007, Brazil 
issued a real-denominated bond (Global BRL 2028) with a 20 year maturity period and a 
10.25% annual coupon which reopened three times. With roughly 1.9 billion US dollars (1 
US dollar = 2.0234 Reais dollars) issued in reais, these local currency bonds accounted 
for 64% of the total international issuance. Still, in terms of volume the outstanding 
amount remains very close: 1.5 billion US dollars in 2005 and 1.4 billion US dollars in 
2006. 
Nevertheless, on the eve of the 2008 crisis the treasury’s annual debt report praised 
Brazil’s lasting ability to issue local currency bonds internationally and recalls Brazil’s 
past woes when the country was afflicted with original sin. In 2008, adverse international 
conditions restricted the scope of Brazil’s continuing external qualitative strategy. The 
international market conditions at the time prevented Brazil from borrowing in real on 
international markets. As for dollar liabilities, the treasury carried out a single operation 
of only 525 million US dollars on which it paid a historically low interest rate of a 6% 
coupon which the treasury called the deal of the year. Brazil did not issue local currency 
debt on international markets in 2009 either. As for the dollar-denominated bonds, 
the country benefited from its rating change from speculative to investment to issue 
bonds yielding interest rates even lower than those of 2008. In 2010, out of the four 
international issuances of sovereign bonds three were denominated in US Dollar and one 
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in reais. As acknowledged by the 2010 annual debt report, the very low Fed funds rates 
created an appetite for the local currency bonds of emerging markets among international 
investors. This enabled Brazil to reopen its Global Brazil Rea (BRL) 2028 for 1.1 billion 
US dollars yielding roughly the same amount as the earlier 2007 issuance of 8.5%. In 
2011, in spite of yet another improvement of Brazil’s external debt’s rating and ever 
decreasing rates on its 30 year US Dollar-denominated bonds over the previous decade, 
Brazil did not issue debt in its own currency. External debt operations were denominated 
exclusively in USD. The National Treasury decided to purchase 11 billion of US Dollar-
denominated bonds so as to cover 49% of the external debt due by 2015. In 2012, Brazil 
issued the Global BRL 2024 in reais for 1.7 billion US dollars and two issuances of US 
Dollar denominated bonds for 2.2 billion US dollars. The 53% of this local-currency 
issuance was aimed at repurchasing the bonds issued in 2005 and 2006 reaching maturity 
in 2016 and 2022. This was aimed to benefit from international demand to improve its 
external debt profile through its buyback program. Finally in 2013, Brazil did not issue 
bonds in reais on international markets.
C. Private debt and original sin 
Regardless of whether the domestic or international market is involved, an increasing 
number of investors have been willing to take on the additional risk of currency 
denomination in the assets they hold. In keeping with original sin theory, currency 
trading is overwhelmingly concentrated in USD, euro, yen, and pounds sterling. Albeit 
insignificant, the Brazilian real did more than triple its share from 0.2 to 0.7% of foreign 
exchange trading between 2001 and 2010. The Brazilian real is now the leading Latin 
American currency for global bonds issuance with 0.25% of the world market, with 
Argentina and Mexico now issuing parts of their bonds in reais (Powell 2014). The rise 
of emerging currencies is not specific to Brazil, instead it shows that a shift has recently 
taken place in the international market architecture fuelled by low US interest rates. 
Interestingly enough, although almost in contradiction with the conventional wisdom, 
an increasing number of international investors have moved directly to the Brazilian 
domestic markets. It is estimated that around 18% of local Brazilian bonds were held by 
international investors in 2012 (BNP Paribas 2013). 
Brazilian public debt was not the only one to catch the eye of international buyers. 
Recent empirical studies have assessed the impact of original sin at the business level as 
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opposed to the state level. For instance, Brei and Charpe (2012) have looked closely at 
five episodes of currency collapse from the viewpoint of non-financial firms operating 
in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. At the business level, they found that the hardest hit 
for firms are those with high levels of unhedged foreign-currency debts. At the state 
level, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico illustrate three contrasting trends. Argentina, unlike 
Brazil, is characterized by a large currency mismatch, and Mexico is halfway between 
the two. Brazilian firms have increasingly relied on bonds rather than loans in their 
international financing operations. Their US dollar-denominated debt tripled between 
2004 and 2012. Private firms have been more prone to issuing a greater share of their 
debts in a foreign currency. 
D. Asymmetry of the international monetary system
Looking at the predicament in the case of Brazil highlights the fact that the key 
feature of any successful issuance of real-denominated securities was that the country 
almost always did not need them. Large and strong domestic market associated with 
large capital inflows dramatically reduced Brazil’s needs for external borrowing either 
in its own currency or in US Dollar. The several issuances made by Brazil have been 
oversubscribed by investors but the monetary denomination was charged with an 
additional premium, as compared with the cost of US Dollar securities or domestic 
market bonds. Even though the real is now the leading Latin American currency, its 
share in international asset denomination remains extremely scant (around 0.5%). 
Moreover, in the post-2008 period, Brazil seems to have benefited in 2010 and 2012 
from favourable international monetary conditions to issue new global bonds in reais. In 
other words, public debt issuance in the local currency may not have been as successful 
as it was believed to be, if we consider economic and financial indicators related to the 
acceptance and spread of Brazilian sovereign bonds issued in reais. If we also consider 
Brazilian firms’ increasing dollar liabilities, it becomes glaring that original sin does not 
wash away easily but recurs. 
Original sin is a solid example of the inertia and asymmetry embedded in the current 
international monetary system. While it is never truly a concern for the dominant 
international currency issuer and is of limited concern for some industrialized economies 
(the Euro area, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK), original sin is a significant problem for 
peripheral economies which cannot borrow abroad in their own currencies. The question 
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of how emerging and developing economies could be rid of original sin has sparked 
much debate. The consensus view is to recommend that these countries accumulate 
large and expensive foreign reserves as a way of insulating themselves from potentially-
destabilizing financial trouble. Another view, endorsed by the G-20 in November 2011, 
involves a multilateral action plan to support the development of local currency bond 
markets in the hope that this would overcome the difficulties encountered by emerging-
market borrowers (IMF et al. 2013). A more promising multilateral solution would be 
to promote new regional financial architecture. One of the great ambitions of the Bank 
of the South, established in 2009 in South America, was precisely to put an end to the 
region’s dependence on the US Dollar and augment mutual regional sources of revenue. 
By strengthening regional bond markets, it may alleviate the burden of original sin 
(Camara-Neto and Vernengo 2010).
E. The case of China
Countries which solve the problem of original sin are assumed to issue bonds in their 
own currencies internationally. The end of the first section emphasizes the specificity 
of RMB emergence which has enabled china to carry out cross-border trade in RMB. 
We will conclude our analysis by focusing on the similarities between that and China’s 
issuance of international debt. 
The country has long experienced twin surpluses. It does not rely on international 
investors due to the high saving rate of the Chinese population, and the trade surpluses 
which have generated huge foreign reserve stocks. However, both the Chinese public 
and the private sector issue bonds. Bonds are issued onshore, but also in a growing 
proportion in offshore markets in order to become available to non-Chinese portfolios. 
RMB-denominated offshore bonds are called dim sum bonds. The main offshore 
market for Chinese financial activities is Hong Kong, where the first dim sum bond was 
issued by the China Development Bank in July 2007. Since then, the market has grown 
strongly.
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Figure 3. Dim Sum Bond issuance
                                                                            (billions of RMB)
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(Source) HSBC’s forecast from Clearstream (2014).
  
The issuers were initially Chinese public institutions, which where progressively 
joined by state-owned enterprises and transnational foreign companies. In 2010 
McDonald’s became the first issuer outside China (Clearstream 2014). Other companies 
such as Caterpillar followed suit. In June 2014, the UK government issued dim sum 
bonds, which was a landmark. The above-mentioned inclusion of the RMB in the SDR 
basket should generate an additional external demand for RMB-denominated assets. 
The development of the dim sum bond market is narrowly tied to the evolution of 
RMB cross-border trade settlement. Indeed, empirical studies have shown the main 
driver of the RMB internationalization to be trade settlement (Gagnon and Troutman 
2014). The amount of outside RMB has been increasing as a result of the slackening 
of the controls on Chinese importers first and on Chinese exporters subsequently. This 
outflow of RMB is reflected by RMB deposits in Hong Kong. 
The size of the RMB bond market is, as one might expect, closely linked to the 
amount of offshore RMB deposits. Dim sum bonds can be viewed as a tool for absorbing 
the growing amount of RMB deposits in offshore RMB platforms (Mathur and De 
2014). These bonds enable RMB users to manage their RMB-trade incomes between 
new purchases and financial investments, through infrastructures provided by clearing 
institutions in Hong Kong (Rhee and Sumulong 2013). In reality, the amount of offshore 
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RMB bonds issuances remains low because it is still costly to issue in RMB.  
However, in the meantime, the RMB has gained a growing influence in Asia and the 
world. China is now able to issue bonds in its own currency, a sure sign of its monetary 
emergence. 
IV. Conclusion
The asymmetries of the international monetary system have been exemplified in this 
paper by international trade invoicing and international debt issuance. In both monetary 
practices, the US Dollar is currently the dominant currency. As a matter of fact, it is 
at the top of a hierarchy of currencies – similar to a pyramid (Cohen 2000) – whose 
foundations are made up of the currencies of developing countries. Right below the US 
Dollar, the intermediary level corresponds to the currencies of industrialized countries, 
like the euro, the pound sterling, or the yen. Of all the emerging countries, for the last 
several years China alone has been able to stand out, providing a rare example of internal 
mobility within that pyramid. 
Not only is the current international monetary system sometimes viewed as 
cacophonic (Rossi 2009), but it also embodies a major constraint on the sovereignty of 
developing countries. It is for this very reason that some governments of developing 
countries have set out to challenge the US Dollar usage. Almost every attempt in 
the last few decades has failed. Asymmetries are seemingly a trap in that developing 
countries intent on avoiding top currencies inevitably encounter difficulties and their 
local currencies suffer from a lack of international confidence and from institutional 
concerns. China’s case is of considerable interest in the study of the international 
monetary system’s evolution: the emergence of China’s economy begins to be mirrored 
in its cross-border monetary practices. China is also gaining ground in international 
organizations such as the IMF, as demonstrated the inclusion of the RMB within the 
SDR basket. 
The future position of China in the hierarchy of currencies remains difficult to 
forecast as is the role it will adopt in the event of a reform of the international monetary 
system (Cohen 2014b, Jiang 2014, Chin 2014). The ascent China has experienced might 
not necessarily alter the fundamentally unequal nature of the structure as a whole.
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